<Thomas Hobbes on monarchomachists & pro-regicides >From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latin writers, in their books, and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. For they say not Regicide, that is, killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull. <Hobbes / From the same books (like Aristotle's Politics), they think in Democracies they are all freemen, but under Monarchies, all slaves >From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves. I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government; for they find no such matter. <Anti-Monarchy writers, they're like Rabid Dogs <Like rabid dogs won't drink water & have a rabid hydrophobia, rabid democratical writers have a rabid tyrannophobia; <A monarchy bitten by rabid, snarling democratical writers wants nothing more than a strong, mean Monarch <Once there is that Strong Monarch, it is a self-fulfilling prophesy & they abhor their Tyrant >In sum, I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudicial to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publicly read, without present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their Venom; Which Venom I will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad Dog, which is a disease the Physicians call Hydrophobia, or Fear Of Water. For as he that is so bitten, has a continual torment of thirst, and yet abhors water; and is in such an estate, as if the poison endeavoured to convert him into a Dog: So when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democraticall writers, that continually snarl at that estate; it wants nothing more than a strong Monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain Tyrannophobia, or fear of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhor. <From Aristotle, they learned to call anything but mixed constitutionalism / representative, Western multi-party democracy -- Tyranny >From Aristotle's Civil Philosophy, they have learned, to call all manner of Commonwealths but the Popular, (such as was at that time the state of Athens,) Tyranny. All Kings they called Tyrants... A Tyrant originally signified no more simply, but a Monarch: But when afterwards in most parts of Greece that kind of government was abolished, the name began to signify, not only the thing it did before, but with it, the hatred which the Popular States bare towards it: As also the name of King became odious after the deposing of the Kings in Rome, as being a thing natural to all men, to conceive some great Fault to be signified in any Attribute, that is given in despight, and to a great Enemy. And when the same men shall be displeased with those that have the administration of the Democracy, or Aristocracy, they are not to seek for disgraceful names to express their anger in; but call readily the one Anarchy, and the other Oligarchy. Hobbes' Nominalism & the arbitrary, petty Namecalling of the political arena <Tyranny and Oligarchy, But Different Names of Monarchy, and Aristocracy >There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other Forms of Government, but of the same Forms misliked. For they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are displeased with Aristocracy, call it Oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the Governours. <Thomas Hobbes / The toleration of a professed hatred of Tyranny, is a toleration of a hatred of Commonwealth in general, & another evil seed >And because the name of Tyranny, signifies nothing more, nor less, than the name of Sovereignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they that use the former word, are understood to be angry with them they call Tyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of Tyranny, is a Toleration of hatred to Commonwealth in general, and another evil seed, not differing much from the former.

Sir Orlando Bridgeman was a Royalist and judge of the trial of the regicides (the regicides of K. Charles I). Related: (He testifies here the legal maxim, The King Can Do No Wrong, or Rex non potest peccare) The judgment of Sir Orlando Bridgman declared in his charge to the jury at the arraignment of the twenty nine regicides (the murtherers of King Charles the First, of Most Glorious Memory) began at Hicks-Hall on Tuesday the ninth of October, 1660, and continued at the sessions-house in the Old-Baily, until Friday the ninteenth of the same month. Link: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A29394.0001.001?view=toc W. P. Esq. – HIGH TREASON >High Treason can be committed against none, but the King's Sacred Person, neither is any thing High Treason, but what is declared so to be by the Statute. 25. Ed. 3. c. 21. to levy War against the King, to compass or imagine his Death, or the Death of his Queen, or of his Eldest Son, to Counterfeit his Money, or his Great Seal, to Imprison the King until he agrees to certain Demands, to Levy War, to alter Religion, or the Law, to remove Counsellors by Arms, or the King from his Counsellors, be they evil or good, by Arms to seize the King's forts, Magazine of War, to Depose the King, or to adhere to any State within or without the Kingdom, but the King's Majesty, is High Treason, for which the Offenders have Judgment: >First, To be drawn to the Gallows. >Secondly, There to be hang'd by the Neck, and cut down alive. >Thirdly, His Entrails to be taken out of his Belly, and he being alive to be burnt before him. >Fourthly, That his Head should be cut off. >Fifthly, That his Body should be cut in four parts. >Sixthly, That his Head and his Quarters should be put where the King our Sovereign Lord pleases.

From Hobbes' Leviathan <A Person, what? >A PERSON, is he “whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction. <The Word Person, Whence >The word Person is latin: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon, which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise, or Outward Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguises the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, has been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himself, or an other; and he that acts another, is said to bear his Person, or act in his name; (in which sense Cicero uses it where he says, “Unus Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I bear three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;”) and is called in diverse occasions, diversely; as a Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like. >Actor, Author; Authority >Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor; and he that owns his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the Actor acts by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner, and in latine Dominus, in Greeke Kurios; speaking of Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of possession, is called Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY. So that by Authority, is always understood a Right of doing any act: and Done By Authority, done by Commission, or License from him whose right it is. <Covenants By Authority, Bind The Author >From hence it follows, that when the Actor makes a Covenant by Authority, he binds thereby the Author, no less than if he had made it himself; and no less subjects him to all the consequences of the same. And therefore all that hath been said formerly, (Chap. 14) of the nature of Covenants between man and man in their naturall capacity, is true also when they are made by their Actors, Representers, or Procurators, that have authority from them, so far-forth as is in their Commission, but no farther. <And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer, not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. For no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave. <But Not The Actor >When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him, not he, but the Author breaks the Law of Nature: for though the Action be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily; to refuse to do it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbids breach of Covenant.

<A Multitude Of Men, How One Person >A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that makes the Person One. And it is the Representer that bears the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude. <Every One Is Author >And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their common Representer, Authority from himself in particular; and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how far he shall represent them, none of them owns more, than they gave him commission to Act. <An Actor May Be Many Men Made One By Plurality Of Voices [Or Majority Vote] >And if the Representative consist of many men, the voice of the greater number, must be considered as the voice of them all. For if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in the Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby the excess of Negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the only voice the Representative has. <Nor From A Great Multitude [Which leads to Factionalism], Unless Directed By One Judgement >And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another [in their factionalism]; and reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Laws of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all Mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be nor need to be any Civil Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection. (Note: I like to think this is Hobbes' objection to Aristotle on "Too Much Unity" & "Atomization" in objecting to Plato's Republic – Where Aristotle suggests that the State goes & shrinks from the State, to the Family, & finally to the Individual, & is destroy, then Hobbes suggests to this & the idea that people are political animals by nature, that Mankind might as well have one world government and have peace without subjection).

<The Generation Of A Common-wealth >The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to bear their Person; and every one to own, and acknowledge himself to be Author of whatsoever he that so bears their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concern the Common Peace and Safety; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment. <This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a real Unity of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, “I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my self, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize all his Actions in like manner.” >This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in latin CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which we owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. <The Definition Of A Common-wealth >And in him consists the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it,) is “One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.” <Sovereign, And Subject, What >And he that carries this Person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have Sovereign Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT. <The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What >A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly Of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted For It, as [well as] he that Voted Against It, shall Authorize all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men. (Note: It is interesting that this also includes those who vote against it thereby are said to consent to it – I assume by Hobbes' definition of consent by inference; aka, that they yet still participate & accept this system & don't actively resist or go somewhere else).

<2. Sovereign Power Cannot Be Forfeited >Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to him they make Sovereign, by Covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Sovereign; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretense of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. Bossuet: <To imagine now, with M. Jurieu, in the people considered to be in this condition, a sovereignty, which is already a species of government, is to insist on a government before all government, and to contradict oneself. Far from the people being sovereign in this condition, there is not even a people in this state. There may be families, as ill-governed as they are ill-secured; there may well be a troop, a mass of people, a confused multitude; but there can be no people, because people supposes something which already brings together some regulated conduct and some establshed law – something which happens only to those who have already begun to leave this unhappy condition, that is to say, that of anarchy. He that is Sovereign makes no covenant beforehand; like Bossuet says, would assume to have government before government >That he which is made Sovereign makes no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be men, those Covenants after he has the Sovereignty are void, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular. >Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Sovereign at his Institution; and others, or one other of his Subjects, or himself alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversy: it returns therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovers the right of Protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the Institution. >It is therefore in vain to grant Sovereignty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receives his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceeds from want of understanding this easy truth, that Covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public Sword; that is, from the untied hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Sovereign; then no man imagines any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Sovereignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and in a Popular Government, proceeds from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.

The Absolutism of Hobbes' Leviathan Now Hobbes also says, that those who limit, or seek to limit, will themselves become like the center in a circle, and take the point & compass to draw the limits, becoming the absolute power: >And whosoever thinking Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater. For all States, Hobbes believes they are simple & absolute: >I have already sufficiently proved (chapt. 18.) that all Governments which men are bound to obey, are Simple, and Absolute. If it is limited (outside of just the fundamental laws, natural & divine, that is), then another must be sovereign, and another form of state: >Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not supreme; that is to say not Sovereign. The Sovereignty therefore was always in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a privilege to lead their Armies; but the Sovereignty was in the Ephori. – It is also important to consider, for the 17th law of Nature, Hobbes states The Seventeenth, No Man Is His Own Judge >And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were never so fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one be admitted to be Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the controversy, that is, the cause of War, remains, against the Law of Nature. In the same sense, Jean Bodin states a Sovereign cannot bind his own hand, appealing to as the Canonists are supposed to have said, that neither could the Pope. And lastly, Hobbes states again: – <Subjecting The Sovereign Power To Civill Laws <A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth, is this, “That he that hath the Sovereign Power, is subject to the Civill Laws.” It is true, that Sovereigns are all subjects to the Laws of Nature; because such laws be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth be abrogated. >But to those Laws which the Sovereign himself, that is, which the Common-wealth makes, he is not subject. For to be subject to Laws, is to be subject to the Commonwealth, that is to the Sovereign Representative, that is to himself; which is not subjection, but freedome from the Laws. Which errour, because it sets the Laws above the Sovereign, sets also a Judge above him, and a Power to punish him; which is to make a new Sovereign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the Confusion, and Dissolution of the Common-wealth.

By Absolute Sovereignty, there are some cases, Jean Bodin talks of an absolute sovereignty & majesty, where the Sovereignty is a simple unity just as a dot or a center in a circle is indivisible in geometry, and so sovereignty has the capacity to govern the State, by drawing the boundaries and limits of things, like a point and compass in geometry, I assume – (& Absolute Sovereignty in Monarchy is not understood to be a mixed, composite kind of State / mixed constitution, limited or mixed monarchy, where the limitation is understood either to the monarch's estate, or as a part of the whole, or by limitation of term or rotational government – since that kind of constitutional monarchy sees, as Aristotle does, the monarch as a part in relation to the whole, it is an inferior & thereby limited monarchy, but with Absolute Sovereignty it is a superior relationship, and does in a way have the relationship of the whole to the part) – & King James VI & I also describes it as a Free Monarchy (Free, signifying Absolute Sovereignty, so Absolute Monarchy) – Hobbes also understood it the same way as King James VI & I, stating that the liberty is to be the liberty of commonwealths or artificial persons (which you can see here: & for Hobbes, what really we call freedom in a Commonwealth is more of a sign of honor, such as the honor a parent has for his children and their status). … It is critical, that the Author is bound by covenant, but the Actor is not, – if I understand it correctly – for the justification for an Absolute Sovereignty in Hobbes' Leviathan. <Jean Bodin / The citizens in particular & the people in general >It is one thing to bind all together, and to bind every one in particular: for so all the citizens particularly swore to the observation of the laws, but not all together for that every one of them in particular was bound unto the power of them all in general. But an oath could not be given by them all: for why, the people in general is a certain universal body, in power and nature divided from every man in particular. Then again to say truly, an oath cannot be made but by a lesser to the greater, but in a popular estate nothing can be greater than the whole body of the people themselves. >But in a monarchy it is otherwise, where every one in particular, and all the people in general, and (as it were) in one body, must swear to the observation of the laws, and their faithful allegiance to one sovereign monarch; who next unto God (of whom he holds his scepter & power) is bound to no man. For an oath carries always with it reverence unto whom, or in whose name it is made, as still given unto a superiour.

<The Fundamental Rights of Sovereignty, according to Thomas Hobbes >1. The Subjects Cannot Change The Form Of Government (The form of Government is a fundamental law) >2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited >3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against The Institution Of The Soveraigne Declared By The Major Part. >4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly Accused By The Subject >5. What Soever The Soveraigne Doth, Is Unpunishable By The Subject >6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary For The Peace And Defence Of His Subjects (And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught Them) >7. The Right of making Rules, whereby the Subject may every man know what is so his owne, as no other Subject can without injustice take it from him >8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All Judicature And Decision Of Controversies: >9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall Think Best: >10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And Ministers, Both Of Peace, And Warre: >11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That (Where No Former Law hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary: >12. And Of Honour And Order And finally, Thomas Hobbes adds, with his 12 marks of Sovereignty (as Jean Bodin would have it): <These Rights Are Indivisible Making it an indivisible sovereignty. … This is what Thomas Hobbes wants you people to be indoctrinated about, so I'll honor him and perform the civil worship of teaching /leftypol/ & /siberia/ all about this. … Let's include Jean Bodin's marks of Sovereignty, while we're at it: <Jean Bodin's Marks of Sovereignty: >1. Make laws >2. Declare war / peace >3. Appoint magistrates >4. Hear last appeals >5. Give pardons >6. Receive fealty & homage >7. Coining of money >8. Regulation of weights & measures >9. Impose taxes >10. The power of life & death; condemn or save, reward or punish Lastly, about the unitary nature of Sovereignty, I won't repeat, since I mentioned it enough. Jean Bodin also states, Sovereignty is perpetual & Hobbes also stresses a continual maintenance of a sovereign & coercive power. The words Sovereignty, Majesty, & Pre-eminence are altogether synonymous with this notion of Monarchy. & what Aristotle calls the qualities of a pre-eminent Monarch: Aristotle - Qualities of a Pre-eminent Monarch: >1. Agreeable to that ground of right which of the great founders of States >2. It would not be right to kill, or ostracize, or exile such a person >3. [We should not] require that he should take his turn in being governed >4. He who has this pre-eminence is in the relation of the Whole to a part >5. He should have the supreme power and subjects' obedience >6. Is like a demigod among men Aristotle went on to say. >Any would be ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them: they would probably retort what, in the fable of Antisthenes, the lions said to the hares.

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>For surely it would not be right to kill, or ostracize, or exile such a person, or… require that he should take his turn in being governed–the whole is naturally superior to the part, and he who has this pre-eminence is in the relation of the whole to the part. But if so the only alternative is that he should have the supreme power, and that mankind should obey him, not in turn, but always. >Such an one may truly be deemed a god among men. Hence we see that legislation is necessarily concerned only with those who are equal in birth and in capacity; and for men of pre-eminent virtue there is no law–they are themselves a law (living law).

Thomas Reeve's England's beauty in seeing King Charles the Second restored to majesty preached by Tho. Reeve ... in the parish church of Waltham Abbey in the county of Essex. https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=eebo2;idno=A58343.0001.001 England's beauty in seeing King Charles the Second restored to majesty https://archive.org/details/england00reev/page/n3/mode/2up

<Thomas Hobbes / Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning >Another grievance is, that same perpetual fear of death which every man must necessarily be in, while he considers with himself that the Ruler has power not only to appoint what punishments he lists on any Transgressions, but that he may also in his wrath, and sensuality, slaughter his innocent Subjects, and those who never offended against the Laws. And truly this is a very great grievance in any form of Government wheresoever it happens: (for it is therefore a grievance because it is; not, because it may be done) but it is the fault of the Ruler, not of the Government; For all the acts of Nero are not essential to Monarchy; yet Subjects are less often undeservedly condemn'd under one Ruler, than under the People: For Kings are only severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent Counsels, or oppose them with reproachfull words, or control their Wills; but they are the cause that that excess of power which one Subject might have above another becomes harmless. Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, no men can undeservedly suffer, but such as are known to him, namely Courtiers, and such as are remarkable for some eminent Charge; and not all neither, but they only who are possessed of what he desires to enjoy; for they that are offensive, and contumelious, are deservedly punisht. Whosoever therefore in a Monarchy will lead a retired life, let him be what he will that Reigns, he is out of danger: for the ambitious only suffer, the rest are protected from the injuries of the more potent. But in a popular Dominion there may be as many Nero's, as there are Orators who sooth the People; for each one of them can doe as much as the People, and they mutually give way to each others appetite (as it were by this secret pact, Spare me to day, and Ile spare thee to morrow) while they exempt those from punishment, who to satisfy their lust, and private hatred, have undeservedly slain their fellow−subjects. Furthermore, there is a certain limit in private power, which if it exceed, it may prove pernicious to the Realm, and by reason whereof it is necessary sometimes for Monarchs to have a care that the commonwealth do thence receive no prejudice.

When it comes to Decentralization vs Centralization or the Pluralist nation of State vs the Unitary notion of State – OP traces this back to antiquity, & between Aristotle (representing the pluralist & concordant, so-called decentralized notion) with Plato (representing the unitary & so-called centralized notion). >Compare & contrast this below: Plato Republic: >That the other citizens too must be sent to the task for which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity. Plato Republic: >For factions… are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Plato Laws: >That all men are, so far as possible, unanimous in the praise and blame they bestow, rejoicing and grieving at the same things, and that they honor with all their heart those laws which render the State as unified as possible Thomas Hobbes >The error concerning mixed government [constitutionalism] has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifies not the concord, but the union of many men. <With Aristotle's Politics: Aristotle / Since the nature of a State is to be a plurality >Further, as a means to the end which he ascribes to the State, the scheme, taken literally is impracticable, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated. I am speaking of the premise from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, "That the greater the unity of the State the better." Is it not obvious that a state at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a State? since the nature of a State is to be plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a State, it becomes a Family, and from being a Family, an Individual; for the Family may be said to be more than the State, and the Individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the State. Again, a State is not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men. Aristotle / state is a partnership of families and of clans in living well, and its object is a full and independent life. And a state is the partnership of clans and villages in a full and independent life, which in our view constitutes a happy and noble life; >These are necessary preconditions of a state's existence, yet nevertheless, even if all these conditions are present, that does not therefore make a state, but a state is a partnership of families and of clans in living well, and its object is a full and independent life. At the same time this will not be realized unless the partners do inhabit one and the same locality and practise intermarriage; this indeed is the reason why family relationships have arisen throughout the states, and brotherhoods and clubs for sacrificial rites and social recreations. But such organization is produced by the feeling of friendship, for friendship is the motive of social life; therefore, while the object of a state is the good life, these things are means to that end. And a state is the partnership of clans and villages in a full and independent life, which in our view constitutes a happy and noble life; the political fellowship must therefore be deemed to exist for the sake of noble actions, not merely for living in common. Hence those who contribute most to such fellowship have a larger part in the state than those who are their equals or superiors in freedom and birth but not their equals in civic virtue, or than those who surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue.

From this in Aristotle comes about a more oligarchic notion of State, albeit it will be mixed, but it is primarily upheld by the heads of the estates or estates-general which is more concordant and the law proceeds from their commonality and meeting than from the unity first (I assume). So those who fall under the Tocquevillist notions invariably hold Aristotle's maxim – wanting the Monarch to be "one among equals" and putting all the focus on the Estates-General or multi-parties, and the heads of those estates meeting in fellowship, with a strong emphasis on the Middle Class or intermediates as the Nobility. This is the hallmark of Tocquevillism & the anti-absolutism of Medievalists, who oppose State Corporatism and Absolute Monarchy on these grounds, appealing to decentralization (the state as plurality; anti-state corporatism) and the middle class (which Aristotle is the stronger proponent of). Aristotle Politics / Anti-State Corporatism / Anti-Absolute Monarchy >For the people becomes a monarch, and is many in one; and the many have the power in their hands, not as individuals, but collectively. Homer says that ‘it is not good to have a rule of many,’ but whether he means this corporate rule, or the rule of many individuals, is uncertain. At all events this sort of democracy, which is now a monarch and no longer under the control of law, seeks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows into a despot; the flatterer is held in honor; this sort of democracy being relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy. The spirit of both is the same, and they alike exercise a despotic rule over the better citizens. Contrast this with Plato again (who does support many in one & state corporatism & unitary notions of State) Plato: <That the other citizens too must be sent to the task for which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity. Finally, Aristotle disagrees with Plato's Statesmen, that Political & Economical have a like science: Aristotle writes in Politics, >Now there is an erroneous opinion that a statesman, king, householder, and a master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state. Aristotle: >The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head: >whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals. <Plato / There won't be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a great household & the bulk of a small city >Visitor: Well then, surely there won't be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a great household, on the one hand, and the bulk of a small city on the other? – Young Socrates: None. – It's clear that there is one sort of expert knowledge concerned with all these things; whether someone gives this the name of kingship, or statesmanship, or household management, let's not pick any quarrel with him. Come to think of it, a lot of our contemporary politics, esp. the Traditionalist Catholics and Right Libertarians, have roots in Aristotle: from stress on the middle class & widely distributed ownership of private property to the emphasis on decentralization and making the State more pluralistic than unity. Besides Tocquevillism (that Medievalists love), another political ideology I find is also robustly Aristotelian is Distributism.

Jean Bodin on equality & a state as household? >But the error originated with Plato, who, after he had established a popular state, introduced dangerous equalization. Then the Academicians who came from his school amplified his reasons, assuming that society is maintained by harmony, harmony by equality of justice, and equality by a popular state. Then all the citizens are made one and the same in the most perfect equality and likeness, and this should be the aim of human society. Aristotle did not confute the hypothesis of Plato, but he thought that Plato had erred especially in trying to make the citizenship one and the same; in that way the state is destroyed and becomes a family. This reasoning seems to me to be ineffective; but I judge the hypothesis not only absurd, as Aristotle would have it, but also clearly false. >And the ancients (to assure Popular estates) did strive to equal all citizens in goods, honours, power, and rewards: and if any one were more virtuous, more just, or more wise, than the rest, he was banished, as I have showed before, seeking to make an equality, if it were possible: and even Plato did wish, That wives and children should be common to all, to the end that no many might say, This is mine, or, That is thine: for those words of Meum, and Tuum (said he) were the breeders of disc0rd, and the ruin of states. By the which there will grow many absurdities: for in so doing, a city shall be ruined, and become a household (as Aristotle said) although that a household or family (which is the true image of a Commonweal) has but one head. And for this cause, an ancient lawmaker, being importuned by some one, to make his country a Popular estate: Make it (says he) in thine own house. And if they say, That it is a goodly thing so to unite citizens and a city, as to make one household of it, they must then take away the plurality of heads and commanders, which are in a Popular estate, to make a Monarch, as the true fathers of a family; and to cut off this equality of goods, power, honour, and commandment, which they seek to make in a Popular estate; for that it is incompatible in a family. Jean Bodin on Monarchy >If we should inspect nature more closely, we should gaze upon monarchy everywhere. To make a beginning from small things, we see the king among the bees, the leader in the herd, the buck among the flocks or the bellwether (as among the cranes themselves the many follow one), and in the separate natures of things some one object excels: thus, adamant among the gems, gold among the metals, the Sun among the stars, and finally God alone, the prince and author of the world. Moresoever, they say that among the evil spirits one alone is supreme. But, not to continue indefinitely, what is a family other than the true image of a state? Yet this is directed by the rule of one, who presents, not a fictitious image, like the doge of Venice, but the true picture of a king. >If, then, Plato were to change the nature of things and set up several lords in the same family, several heads for the same body, several pilots on a ship, and finally several leaders among bees, flocks, herds (if only the farmers will permit); if at length he would join several gods into an association for ruling, then I would agree with him that the rule of the optimates is better than a kingdom. >But if the entire nature of things protests, reason dissents, lasting experience objects, I do not see why we ought to follow Plato or anyone else and violate nature. What Homer has said, "No good thing is a number of masters; let one man be master, one man be king," Euripides has repeated, "Power belongs to one man in the homes and in the cities." For this reason Sibylla is said to have prophesied in her poems that the safety of the Roman Republic is founded upon a kingdom, that is, the citizens cannot be protected unless they have a king.

Jean Bodin on Equality continued >For if we refer all things to nature, which is chief of all things, it becomes plain that this world, which is superior to anything ever joined together by immortal God, consists of unequal parts and mutually discordant elements and contrary motions of the spheres, so that if the harmony through dissimilarity is taken away, the whole will be ruined. In the same way the best republic, if it imitates nature, which it must do, is held together stable and unshaken by those commanding and obeying, servants and lords, powerful and needy, good and wicked, strong and weak, as if by the mixed association of unlike minds. As on the lyre and in song itself the skilled ears cannot endure that sameness of harmony which is called unison; on the contrary, a pleasing harmony is produced by dissimilar notes, deep and high, combined in accordance with certain rules, so also no normal person could endure equality, or rather democratic uniformity in the state. On the other hand, a state graduated from the highest to the lowest, with the middle orders scattered between in moderate proportion, fits together in a marvelous way through complementary action. It is true this gives rise to that blight of all public affairs, the fact that people who are alike from a certain aspect think that they are altogether unlike; but, those who are in a certain degree unlike, think that they are altogether alike. If, therefore, such is the disparity of men among themselves, such the disparity of natural talent, who would divide authority, resources, honors, and offices on the basis of equality? It is as if the same food and clothing were given to boys, grown men, old men, the sick, and the strong and by this reasoning they think to preserve equality.

Hobbes on Equality >The cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality of men, partly in their mutual will of hurting: whence it comes to pass that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to ourselves the least security: For if we look on men fullgrown, and consider how brittle the frame of our human body is, (which perishing, all its strength, vigour, and wisdom itself perishes with it) and how easy a matter it is, even for the weakest man to kill the strongest, there is no reason why any man trusting to his own strength should conceive himself made by nature above others: they are equals who can do equal things one against the other; but they who can do the greatest things, (namely kill) can do equal things. All men therefore among themselves are by nature equal. >The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not to the natural, but civil state; for it has been showed before, Cap. I. Art. 3. that all men by nature are equal, and therefore the inequality which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of kindred, is come from the civil law. I know that Aristotle in the first book of Politics affirms as a foundation of the whole political science, that some men by nature are made worthy to command, others only to serve; as if Lord and Master were distinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptness, that is, a certain kind of natural knowledge, or ignorance; which foundation is not only against reason (as but now has been showed) but also against experience: for neither almost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himself, than to yield himself to the government of another; neither if the wiser and stronger do contest, have these ever, or often the upper hand of those. Whether therefore men be equal by nature, the equality is to be acknowledged, or whether unequal, because they are like to contest for dominion, its necessary for the obtaining of Peace, that they be esteemed as equal; and therefore it is in the eight place of the Law of nature, That every man be accounted by nature equal to another, the contrary to which Law is PRIDE. >Some there are who are discontented with the government under one, for no other reason, but because it is under one; as if it were an unreasonable thing that one man among so many, should so far excel in power, as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of all the rest; these men sure, if they could, would withdraw themselves from under the Dominion of one God. But this exception against one is suggested by envy, while they see one man in possession of what all desire: for the same cause they would judge it to be as unreasonable, if a few commanded, unless they themselves either were, or hoped to be of the number; for if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have not an equal Right, surely an Oligarchy must be unreasonable also. But because we have showed that the state of equality is the state of war, and that therefore inequality was introduc'd by a general consent; this inequality whereby he, whom we have voluntarily given more to, enjoys more, is no longer to be accompted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences therefore which attend the Dominion of one man, attend his Person, not his Unity. >This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the Sovereignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of Sovereign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of less power than them all together. For if by All Together, they mean not the collective body as one person, then All Together, and Every One, signify the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by All Together, they understand them as one Person (which person the Sovereign appears,) then the power of all together, is the same with the Sovereign's power; and so again the speech is absurd; which absurdity they see well enough, when the Sovereignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not; and yet the power of Sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed. >And as the power, so also the honour of the sovereign, ought to be greater than that of any or all the subjects. For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honour. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince as his creatures. As in the presence of the master, the servants are equal, and without any honour at all; so are the subjects, in the presence of the sovereign. And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the stars in the presence of the Sun. >The inequality of subjects proceeds from the acts of sovereign power, and therefore has no more place in the presence of the sovereign; that is to say, in a court of justice, than the inequality between kings and their subjects in the presence of the King of kings. The honour of great persons is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aids they give to men of inferior rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do are not extenuated, but aggravated, by the greatness of their persons, because they have the least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great proceed in this manner. Impunity makes insolence; insolence, hatred; and hatred, an endeavor to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness, though with the ruin of the Commonwealth.

It was the geometrical method that Hobbes attempted to apply not only to political science but to the whole of science that lead Marx and English to describe Hobbes' materialism as "misanthropic" since it lacked the "poetic glamour" that materialism still possessed in Bacon's writings. Marx and Engels summed up the development of English philosophy in The Holy Family in 1844 "In its further evolution, materialism becomes one-sided. Hobbes is the man who systematises Baconian materialism. Knowledge based upon the senses loses its poetic blossom, it passes into the abstract experience of the geometrician. Physical motion is sacrificed to mechanical or mathematical motion; geometry is proclaimed as the queen of sciences. Materialism takes to misanthropy. If it is to overcome its opponent, misanthropic, fleshless spiritualism, and that on the latter's own ground, materialism has to chastise its own flesh and turn ascetic. Thus it passes into an intellectual entity; but thus, too, it evolves all the consistency, regardless of consequences, characteristic of the intellect."

Jean Bodin & Thomas Hobbes differ in that Hobbes stresses Geometry in general & Jean Bodin stresses Royal Harmony & Harmonical order: Jean Bodin didn't appreciate in Plato's Republic his notion of a community of pleasures and pains, whereas Thomas Hobbes did acknowledge public worship consists in uniformity (& did have more egalitarian views compared to Jean Bodin). Plato Republic >And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains–where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow? >No doubt. >Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is disorganized–when you have one half of the world triumphing and the other plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the citizens? >Certainly. Jean Bodin rejected this idea, & stressed private property; didn't like how Plato came close to a "dangerous equality" and inevitably democracy. Instead, Jean Bodin supported the idea of a Royal Harmony (which I think is also in Plato's Statesmen for a Royal Weaver) that harmonizes the opposite parties in a state. Whereas Thomas Hobbes (I think) supports the geometic notion of State more (and has the iconic unity of democracy and monarchy, Leviathan, as One Person and formally called "The People"). … Aristotle also acknowledges the community of pleasures and pains in Plato, and that an organized State needs similitude and equality, or some likeness – rather than abolish private property as Plato suggests for Meum & Tuum, Aristotle suggests a stronger Middle Class to oppose the extremes of rich and poor. … My Opinion I partially disagree with Jean Bodin & gravitate towards what Hobbes seems to suggest, because a community of pleasures and pains is desired (& I strongly see the appeal) – the harmony Bodin wants, and the community of pleasures and pains – is manifest in Monarchical rule best by the Cult of Personality, & Hobbes' Leviathan is one big so-called Cult of Personality (in a way); others who would seemingly disagree with Plato and agree with Aristotle, like most Wignats / Natsoc types, also long for a community of pleasures and pains, except instead of abolishing Meum & Tuum and private property, it is properties of persons defined as race – which also has the benefit of a cult of personality, and many socialist states benefit from a cult of personality because one man brings unity so long desired in State Corporatism and Party Vanguardism – this leads to modern monarchies often manifest through what people call secular dictatorships. The use of monarchy for a community of pleasures and pains, as well as the image of a family for the State, I think Plato underestimated as much as Bodin underestimated a community of pleasures and pains and for a "dangerous equality". They pair well together and North Korea is proof of it to me. There is a community of wives and children, but not to the alienation of any family: it has its proper and common place. (END) ---- Jean Bodin Royal Harmony Continued: Bodin was deeply concerned with the question of harmony and order in a very disordered time. For Bodin, the common good depended on order, and order in society could only exist through a well-established and properly functioning monarchy. In Bodin's view the end of law is to secure order in the Commonweale. He even goes so far as to say that it is 'better to have an evil Commonweale than none at all'. The state should be built with relation to the concord of numbers. The three types of progression–arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic–he called the three daughters of Themis, representing order, justice, and peace. The middle term included the other two. The arithmetic progression was more suited to a democratic state, since it denoted equality. Plato, in building an aristocratic state, preferred that it should be governed according to the geometric system. But the harmonic ratio, developed from the other two, portrayed the relationship of overlord and vassal and was therefore suited to a monarchy. It represented peace, and this was the highest objective of all empires. Here Bodin entered upon a discussion of musical intervals, probably drawn from Boethius or Macrobius, which sought to show a parallel between the well-tempered state and concord in music. The conclusion is that a state can best avoid danger from within or from without if it is built on harmonic principles, which for Bodin meant a monarchy administrated in the interests of all. "As for the fact that Plato wished his state to be governed according to geometric ratio, Aristotle decided subtly and cleverly that this concerned rewards only. Arithmetic ratio he related to honoring pledges and to penalties. How rightly, I will not discuss; but about the harmonic ratio neither said anything. Yet I think this ratio, as the most beautiful of all, pertains to the form of the best empire. First because it is developed from arithmetic and geometric ratios alone, yet is unlike each. The harmonic ratio cannot pertain to penalties or rewards, or to pledges, since in pledges an arithmetic equality inheres, in penalties and rewards an equable geometrical similarity. In the harmonic alone inheres the relationship of the superior and the inferior."

Jean Bodin / Of the three kinds of justice, Distributive, Commutative, and Harmonical: and what proportion they have unto an estate Royal, Oligarchic, and Popular >Let us then say in continuing of our purpose, that it is not enough to maintain, that a Monarchy is the best estate of a Commonweal, & which in it has the least inconvenience; except we also (as we said) add thereunto, a Monarchy Royal. Neither yet suffices it to say, that the Royal Monarchy is most excellent, if we should not also show that unto the absolute perfection thereof it ought to be fast knit together by an Oligarchic and Popular kind of government: which are proper unto the estates Oligarchic, and Popular. In which doing, the estate of the Monarchy shall be simple, and yet the government so compound and mixt, without any confusion at all of the three kinds of Estates, or Commonweales. For we have before shewed, that there is a great difference betwixt the mingling, or rather confounding of the three estates of Commonweales in one (a thing altogether impossible) and the making of a government of a Monarchy, to be Oligarchic and Popular. For as amongst Monarchies, the Royal Monarchy so governed (as I have said) is the most commendable: even so amongst kingdoms, that which holds most, or comes nearest unto this Harmonical Justice, is of others the most perfect. Justice therefore I say to be The right division of rewards and punishments, and of that which of right unto every man belongs. For that by these, as by most certain guides, wee must enter into this most religious and stately temple of Justice. But this equal division which we seek for, can in no wise be accomplished, or performed, but by a moderate mixture, and confusion of equality, and similitude together, which is the true proportion Harmonicall, and whereof no man hath as yet spoken. >Plato having presupposed the best form of a Commonweale, to be that which was composed of a Tyrannicall and Popular estate: in framing the same, is contrary unto himself, hauing established a Commonweale not only Popular, but altogether a∣so Popularly governed; giving unto the whole assembly of his citizens, the power to make, and to abrogate laws, to place and displace all manner of officers, to determine of peace and warre, to judge of the goods, the life, and honour, of every particular man in sovereignty: which is indeed the true Popular estate, and Popularly also governed. And albeit that he had so (as we say) formed his Commonweale, yet neuerthelesse hee said, That the Commonweale could never be happy, if it were not by Geometrical proportion governed; saying that God (whom every wise lawmaker ought to imitate) in the government of the world always useth Geometrical proportion. >Now certain it is, that Distributive, or Geometrical Justice, is most contrary unto the Popular estate and government by Plato set down: the people still seeking after nothing more, than for equalitie in all things; a thing proper unto Commutative, or Arithmetical Justice. Which was the cause for which Xenophon (Plato his companion, and both of them jealous one of another's glory) being of opinion, That Commonweales ought to be framed, and the laws administered according unto Arithmetical proportion and equality, brings in Cyrus yet a boy, corrected and chastised, for that he being chosen king, had changed but the servants garments, appointing better apparel unto them of the better sort, and meaner unto them of the meaner sort: as having therein regard unto decency, and the proportion Geometrical After which chastisement, Cyrus is by his master taught, to give unto every man that which unto him belongs, and to remember that he was a Persian borne, and was therefore to use the Persian laws and customs, which gave unto every man that which was unto him proper: and not the manners and fashions of the Medes, who thought it meet, that to be unto every man given, which was decent and convenient for him. Which writings of Xenophon, Plato having read, and knowing right well that it was himself, and not Cyrus, which had been corrected; forthwith reproved the Cyropaedia, without naming of any partie. This diversity of opinions, betwixt Xenophon and Plato (famous among the Greeks) was the cause of two great factions, the one of the Nobility and richer sort, who held for Geometrical Justice, and the Oligarchical estate; the other of the baser and poorer sort, who maintained Commutative or Arithmetical Justice, and therefore wished to have had all estates and Commonweales Popular. Now of these two factions arise a third, which was of opinion, That in euery Commonweale Arithmetical Justice was to be kept in just equality, when question was of the goods of any one in particular, or for the recompensing of offences and forfeitures: but if question were of common rewards to be bestowed out of the common treasure, or for the division of countries conquered, or for the inflicting of common punishments, that then Distributive, or Geometrical Justice, was to be observed and kept, having regard unto the good or evil deserts, and the qualities or calling of every man: insomuch that these men used two proportions, and yet for all that diversely, sometime the one and some∣time the other: as Aristotle said it ought to be done, but yet not naming either Plato or Xenophon, who yet had both first touched this string.

>So the royal estate also by a necessary consequence framed unto the harmonicall proportion, if it be royally ordered and governed, that is to say, Harmonically; there is no doubt but that of all other estates it is the fairest, the happiest, and most perfect. But here I speak not of a lordly monarchy, where the Monarch, though a natural prince born, holds all his subjects underfoot as slaves, disposing of their goods as of his own: and yet much less of a tyrannical monarchy, where the Monarch being no natural Lord, abuses neuerthelesse the subjects and their goods at his pleasure, as if they were his very slaves; and yet worse also when he makes them slaves unto his own cruelties. But my speech and meaning is of a lawful King, whether he be so by election, for his virtue and religion, by voice chosen, so as was Numa; or by divine lot, as was Saul; or that he haue by strong hand and force of armes, as a conquerour got his kingdome, as have many; or that he have it by a lawful and orderly succession, as have all (except some few) who with no less love and care favours and defends his subjects, than if they were his own children. And yet such a King may nevertheless if he will, governe his kingdome popularly and by equall Arithmetical proportion, calling all his subiects indifferently without respect of persons unto all honours and preferments whatsoever, without making choyce of their deserts or sufficiency, whether it be that they be chosen by lot or by order one of them after another: howbeit that there be few or rather no such monarchies indeed. So the King may also govern his estate or kingdome Aristocratically, bestowing the honorable estates and charges therein with the distribution of punishments and rewards by Geometrical proportion, making still choice of the nobility of some, and of the riches of others, still rejecting the base poorer sort, and yet without any regard had unto the deserts or virtues of them whom he so preferred; but onely vnto him that is best monyed or most noble. Both which manner of governments, howbeit that they bee euill and blameworthy, yet is this Oligarchic and Geometrical proportion of government much more tolerable and more sure, than is that popular and turbulent government, scarcely any where to bee found, as nearer approaching unto the sweet Harmonicall government. For it may be, that the king to assure his estate against the insurrection of the base common people, may have need to strengthen himself with the nobility, which come nee∣rer unto his quality and condition, than doth the base artificers and common sort of people, unto whom he cannot descend, neither with them well have any society at all, if he will in any good sort maintain the maiesty of his royal estate and sovereignty, as it seems he must of necessity do, if he shall make them partakers of the most honourable charges of his estate and kingdome. But such an Oligarchic kind of government is also euill and dangerous, not unto the common people only, but even unto the nobility & prince also: who may so still stand in fear of the discontented vulgar sort, which is always far in number more than is the nobility or the rich: and having got some seditious leader, and so taking up of arms, becomes the stronger part, and so sometimes revolting from their prince, drives out the nobility, and fortify themselves against their princes power: >But now in civil societies there is no mean better to bind and combine the little ones with the great, the base with the noble, the poor with the rich, than by communicating of the offices, estates, dignities, and preferments, unto all men, as well the base as the noble, according unto every mans virtues and deserts, as wee have before declared... but we must also, to make an harmony of one of them with another, mingle them which have wherewith in some sort to supply that which wanteth in the other. For otherwise there shall be no more harmony than if one should separate the concords of music which are in themselves good, but yet would make no good consent if they were not bound together: for that the default of the one is sup∣plied by the other. In which doing, the wise prince shall set his subjects in a most sweet quiet, bound together with an indissoluble bond one of them unto another, together with himself, and the Commonweale. As is in the four first numbers to bee seen: which God hath in Harmonicall proportion disposed to show unto us, that the Royal estate is Harmonicall, and also to be Harmonically governed. For two to three makes a fifth; three to four, a fourth; two to four, an eight; and again afterwards, one to two, makea an eight; one to three, a twelfth, holding the fifth and the eight; & one to four, a double eight, or Diapason: which contains the whole ground and compass of all tunes and concords of music, beyond which he which will passe unto five, shall in so doing mar the harmony, and make an intolerable discord. >Now the sovereign prince is exalted above all his subjects, and exempt out of the rank of them: whose majesty suffers no more division than doth the unity itself, which is not set nor accounted among the numbers, howbeit that they all from it take both their force and power... And as many men for lack of understanding live like beast, smoothed with that only which is present and before them, without mounting any higher unto the contemplation of things intellectual and divine, whom the sacred scriptures call also beasts: even so also the Oligarchic and popular Common∣weales without understanding, that is to say, without a prince, are in some sort able to maintain and defend themselves, though not long: being indeed about to become much more happy if they had a sovereign prince, which with his authority and power might (as doth the understanding) reconcile all the parts, and so unite and bind them fast in happiness together. >For that as of unity depends the union of all numbers, which have no power but from it: so also is one souvereign prince in euery Commonweale necessary, from the power of whom all others orderly depend. But as there cannot bee good music wherein there is not some discord, which must of necessity be intermingled to give the better grace unto the Harmony. So also is it necessary that there should be some fools amongst wise men, some unworthy of their charge amongst men of great experience, and some evil and vile men amongst the good and virtuous, to give them the greater lustre, and to make the difference known (even by the pointing of the finger, and the sight of the eye) betwixt virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance. For when sools, vicious, and wicked men, are contemned & despised, then the wise, virtuous, and good men, receive the true reward and guerdon for their virtue, which is honour. >And it seems the ancient Greeks in their fables, to have aptly shadowed forth unto vs that which wee have spoken of these three kinds of Justice, giving unto Themis three daughters. That is to say, Upright Law, Equity, and Peace: which are referred unto the three forms of Justice, Arithmetical, Geometrical, and Harmonicall:

>But these things thus declared, it remains for us to know (as the chief point of this our present discourse) Whether it be true that Plato saith, God to govern this world by Geometrical proportion: For that he hath taken it as a ground, to shew that a well ordered Commonweale ought (to the imitation of the world) to be governed by Geometrical Justice: Which I have shewed to be contrary, by the nature of the unity, Harmonically referred unto the three first numbers: as also by the intellectual power, compared unto the three other powers of the soul: and by a point compared to a line, a plain superficies, or other solid body. But let us go farther, for if Plato had looked nearer into the wonderfull Fabric of the world, he should have marked that which he forgot in his Timeo, viz. The Great God of nature to have Harmonically composed this world of Matter and Form, of which the one is maintained by the help of the other, and that by the proportion of equality and similitude combined & bound together. And for that the Matter was to no use without the Form, and that the form could have no being without the matter, neither in the whole universal, neither yet in the parts thereof: he made the world equal to the one, and semblance to the other: equall unto the matter whereof it is made, for that it comprehends all: and semblance or like unto the form, in such sort as is the Harmonicall proportion composed of the Arithmetical and Geometrical proportions equall to the one, and semblable to the other, being one of them separate from another unperfect. >So also a well ordered Commonweale is composed of good and bad, of the rich and of the poor, of wisemen and of fools, of the strong and of the weak, allied by them which are in the mean betwixt both: which so by a wonderfull disagreeing concord, ioin the highest with the lowest, and so all to all, yet so as that the good are still stronger than the bad; so as he the most wise workman of all others, and governor of the world hath by his eternal law decreed. And as he himself being of an infinite force and power rules over the angels, so also the angels over men, men over beasts, the soul over the the body. >Wherefore what the unity is in numbers, the understanding in the powers of the soul, and the center in a circle: so likewise in this world that most mighty king, in unity simple, in nature indivisible, in purity most holy, exalted far above the Fabric of the celestial Spheres, joining this elementary world with the celestiall and intelligible heavens; with a certain secure care preserves from destruction this triple world, bound together with a most sweet and Harmonicall consent: unto the imitation of whom, every good prince which wishes his Kingdom and Commonweale not in safety only, but even good and blessed also, is to frame and conform himself.

Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan / Justice Commutative, And Distributive >Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative, and Distributive; and the former they say consisteth in proportion Arithmeticall; the later in proportion Geometricall. Commutative therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for; And Distributive, in the distribution of equall benefit, to men of equall merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give. And Merit (besides that which is by Covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under Justice Commutative, not Distributive,) is not due by Justice; but is rewarded of Grace onely. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, Commutative [or Arithmetical] Justice is the Justice of a Contractor; that is, a Performance of Covenant, in Buying, and Selling; Hiring, and Letting to Hire; Lending, and Borrowing; Exchanging, Bartering, and other acts of Contract. >And Distributive [or Geometrical] Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say, the act of defining what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make him Arbitrator,) if he performe his Trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own: and his is indeed Just Distribution, and may be called (though improperly) Distributive [or Geometrical] Justice; but more properly Equity; which also is a Law of Nature, as shall be shewn in due place. Hobbes Elements of Law - Communative (Arithmetical) & Distributive (Geometrical) >Concerning. the justice of actions, the same is usually divided into two kinds, whereof men call the one commutative [arithmetical], and the other distributive [geometrical]; and are said to consist, the one in proportion arithmetical, the other in geometrical: and commutative justice, they place in permutation, as buying, selling, and barter. Distributive, in giving to every man according to their deserts. -- Which distinction is not well made, inasmuch as injury, which is the injustice of action, consists not in the inequality of things changed, or distributed, but in the inequality that men (contrary to nature and reason) assume unto themselves above their fellows; of which inequality shall be spoken hereafter. >And for commutative justice placed in buying and selling, though the thing bought be unequal to the price given for it; yet forasmuch as both the buyer and the seller are made judges of the value, and are thereby both satisfied: there can be no injury done on either side, neither party having trusted, or covenanted with the other. And for distributive justice, which consists in the distribution of our own benefits; seeing a thing is therefore said to be our own, because we may dispose of it at our own pleasure: it can be no injury to any man, though our liberality be further extended towards another, than towards him; unless we be thereto obliged by covenant: and then the injustice consists in the violation of that covenant, and not in the inequality of distribution. ... >Seeing then many rights are retained, when we enter into peace one with another, reason and the law of nature dictates, Whatsoever right any man requireth to retain, he allow every other man to retain the same. For he that doth not so, allows not the equality mentioned in the former section. For there is no acknowledgement of the equality of worth, without attribution of the equality of benefit and respect. And this allowance of aequalia aequalibus, is the same thing with the allowing of proportionalia proportionalibus. For when a man allows to every man alike, the allowance he makes will be in the same proportion, in which are the numbers of men to whom they are made. And this is it men mean by distributive justice, and is properly termed EQUITY. The breach of this law is that which the Greeks call Pleovezia, which is commonly rendered covetousness, but seems to be more precisely expressed by the word ENCROACHING. Jean Bodin on Arithmetic, Geometric, & Harmonic >"As for the fact that Plato wished his state to be governed according to geometric ratio, Aristotle decided subtly and cleverly that this concerned rewards only. Arithmetic ratio he related to honoring pledges and to penalties. How rightly, I will not discuss; but about the harmonic ratio neither said anything. Yet I think this ratio, as the most beautiful of all, pertains to the form of the best empire. First because it is developed from arithmetic and geometric ratios alone, yet is unlike each. The harmonic ratio cannot pertain to penalties or rewards, or to pledges, since in pledges an arithmetic equality inheres, in penalties and rewards an equable geometrical similarity. In the harmonic alone inheres the relationship of the superior and the inferior." The state should be built with relation to the concord of numbers. The three types of progression–arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic–he called the three daughters of Themis, representing order, justice, and peace. The middle term included the other two. The arithmetic progression was more suited to a democratic state, since it denoted equality. Plato, in building an aristocratic state, preferred that it should be governed according to the geometric system. But the harmonic ratio, developed from the other two, portrayed the relationship of overlord and vassal and was therefore suited to a monarchy. It represented peace, and this was the highest objective of all empires. Here Bodin entered upon a discussion of musical intervals, probably drawn from Boethius or Macrobius, which sought to show a parallel between the well-tempered state and concord in music. The conclusion is that a state can best avoid danger from within or from without if it is built on harmonic principles, which for Bodin meant a monarchy administrated in the interests of all.

Thomas Hobbes' De Cive on Commutative and Distributive >The justice of actions is commonly distinguisht into two kinds; Commutative, and Distributive, the former whereof they say consists in Arithmetical, the latter in Geometrical proportion: >And that is conversant in exchanging, in buying, selling, borrowing, lending, location, and conduction, and other acts whatsoever belonging to Contracters, where, if there be an equal return made, hence they say springs a commutative justice: <But this is busied about the dignity, and merits of men; so as if there be rendered to every man kata pen axian more to him who is more worthy, and less to him that deserves less, and that proportionably, hence they say arises distributive justice: >I acknowledge here some certain distinction of equality; to wit, that one is an equality simply so called, as when two things of equal value are compared together, as a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver; the other is an equality, secundum quod; as when a 1000 pound is to be divided to an hundred men, 600 pounds are given to 60 men, and 400 to 40 where there is no equality between 600 and 400. But when it happens, that there is the same inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed, every one of them shall take an equal part, whence it is called an equal distribution: But such like equality is the same thing with Geometrical proportion. But what is all this to Justice? for neither, if I sell my goods for as much as I can get for them, do I injure the buyer, who sought, and desired them of me? neither if I divide more of what is mine to him who deserves less, so long as I give the other what I have agreed for, do I wrong to either? which truth our Saviour himself, being God, testifies in the Gospel. This therefore is no distinction of Justice, but of equality; yet perhaps it cannot be denied, but that Justice is a certain equality, as consisting in this only; that since we are all equal by nature, one should not arrogate more Right to himself, than he grants to another, unless he have fairly gotten it by Compact. And let this suffice to be spoken against this distinction of Justice, although now almost generally received by all, lest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat else, than the breach of Faith, or Contract, as hath been defined above. Thomas Hobbes on Harmony >Concerning the delight of hearing, it is diverse, and the organ itself not affected thereby. Simple sounds please by continuance and equality, as the sound of a bell or lute: insomuch that it seemeth an equality continued by the percussion of the object upon the ear, is pleasure; the contrary is called harshness: such as is grating, and some other sounds, which do not always affect the body, but only sometimes, and that with a kind of horror beginning at the teeth. Harmony, or many sounds together agreeing, please by the same reason as unison, which is the sound of equal strings equally stretched. Sounds that differ in any height, please by inequality and equality alternate, that is to say, the higher note striketh twice, for one stroke of the other, whereby they strike together every second time; as is well proved by Galileo, in the first dialogue concerning local motions, where he also shows, that two sounds differing a fifth, delight the ear by an equality of striking after two inequalities; for the higher note strikes the ear thrice, while the other striketh but twice. In the like manner he shows, wherein consists the pleasure of concord, and the displeasure of discord, in other differences of notes. >There is yet another pleasure and displeasure of sounds, which consists in consequence of one note after another, diversified both by accent and measure: whereof that which pleases is called air. But for what reason succession in one tone and measure is more air than another, I confess I know not; but I conjecture the reason to be, for that some of them may imitate and revive some passion which otherwise we take no notice of, and the other not; for no air pleases but for a time, no more doth imitation. Also the pleasures of the eye consist in a certain equality of colour: for light, the most glorious of all colours, is made by equal operation of the object; whereas colour is (perturbed, that is to say) unequal light, as has been said chap. II, sect. 8. And therefore colours, the more equality is in them, the more resplendent they are. >And as harmony is a pleasure to the ear, which consisteth of divers sounds; so perhaps may some mixture of divers colours be harmony to the eye, more than another mixture.

Jean Bodin on Sovereignty & Citizenship; No matter how scattered, how diverse the laws & customs, & provinces, but subject to the same sovereignty: >Wherefore of many citizens, be they naturals, or naturalized, or else slaves enfranchised (which are the three means that the law gives to become a citizen by) is made a Commonwealth, when they are governed by the puissant sovereignty of one or many rulers: albeit that they differ among themselves in laws, language, customs, religions, and diversity of nations. But if all the citizens be governed by the selfesame laws and customs, it is not only one Commonwealth, but also one very city, albeit that the citizens be divided in many villages, towns, or provinces. >For the enclosure of walls make not a city, (as many have written) no more than the walls of an house make a family, which may consist of many slaves or children, although they be far distant one from another, or in diverse countries, provided that they be all subject unto the command of one head of the family: So say we of a City, which may have many towns and villages, which use the same customs and fashions, as are the Bailiwicks, or Stewardships of this realm: And so the Commonwealth may have many cities and provinces which may have diverse customs, and yet are nevertheless subject unto the command of their sovereign lords, and unto their edicts and ordinances. And it may also be that every town and city may have certain privileges in particular, which are not common unto them of the suburbs; and the suburbs also may have certain prerogatives which are not common unto the villages, nor to the inhabitants of the open country; who are yet nevertheless subjects of the same Commonwealth, and citisens of their city; & elsewhere: >Not only in the Roman Republic, but everywhere else we shall find this difference in citizens. Rome within the same walls there were patricians, knights, and plebs; among the ancient Egyptians, priests, soldiers, and workmen, as Diodorus wrote; among our ancestors, Druids, knights, and farmers; today, clergy, nobles, and plebs; among the Venetians, nobles, citizens, and plebs; formerl y among the Florentines, nobles, people, and plebs, and three classes of the people-the more powerful, the ordinary, and the lowest. Plato also provided for guardians, soldiers, and farmers. Everywhere each group in turn was divided from the other by rights, laws, offices, votes, honors, privileges, status, exemption, or by some other means. Yet all are citizens of the republic, like the members of the same body. Rightly St.Paul said, "Will the foot say, I am not the eye, therefore I am not of the body? Bodin's disagreement with Cicero on his definition of a State; it confuses state & association >Cicero's definition of the state as a group of men associated for the sake of living well indicates the best objective, indeed, but not the power and the nature of the institution. This definition applies equally well to the assemblies of the Pythagoreans and of men who also come together for the sake of living well, yet they cannot be called states without great confusion of state and association. Bodin / Albeit the Turks had peoples living together under no common system of law -- they were a state, and subject to the same officials and authority >But it would be absurd to say that the empire of the Turks, which includes peoples living together under no common system of law, is not a state, since all are kept together by the same officials and authority. It is not the walls that make a Commonwealth. Jean Bodin's definition of a citizen: >A citizen is one who enjoys the common liberty and the protection of authority. >"A free subject who is dependent on the sovereignty of another person" [& whose full freedom is] "limited by the sovereign power to which he owes obedience." >Now the made or naturalized citizen is he who has submitted himself unto the sovereignty of another. <Note: A Citizen must be a free subject; Note: Slaves cannot be accounted Citizens Jean Bodin defined a citizen as a free subject who is obligated to be politically loyal. He believed that citizens were free in status, but still bound by the obligations of imperium. Citizens are free subjects who are politically loyal; Citizens are bound by the obligations of imperium. Assumpti or creati subjects are foreigners or naturally free people who are made into subjects through conquest or naturalization. Thomas Hobbes' definition of Sovereign & Subject <Sovereign, And Subject, What >And he that carries this Person [of the Leviathan or Artificial Person], is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have Sovereign Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT. <In Elements of Law >That one man or one council, to whom the particular members have given that common power, is called their SOVEREIGN, and his power the sovereign power. >And every member of the body politic, is called a SUBJECT, (viz.) to the sovereign

Bodin's disagreement with Aristotle's definition of citizenship >Aristotle defined a citizen as one who may share in the administration of justice, may hold office, or act in a deliberative capacity. This definition, he confessed, is suited to a popular rule only. But since a definition ought to deal with universals, no one will be a citizen according to the idea of Aristotle, unless born at Athens and in the time of Pericles. The others will be exiles or strangers in their own cities, debarred from honors, judicial matters, and public counsels. Contrary to Aristotle, a Roman Emperor made all free men under his sovereignty to be Roman citizens, who didn't have popular rights >What, then, is to be done in the case of Emperor Antonine, who in a proclamation ordered that all free men included within the limits of the Roman monarchy should be Roman citizens? If we are to believe Aristotle, they were aliens because they had been denied popular rights. Aristotle's definition could be the pretext for civil wars >Since these opinions are absurd and dangerous for governments, then the conclusions which follow from them must seem absurd also. This definition of Aristotle caused Contarini, Sigonius, Garimberto and many others to err. There is no doubt that in many countries it offered an excellent pretext for civil war. This definition of Aristotle's might not even be suitable for a popular state >But what if this description of a citizen brought forward by Aristotle were not suited even to a popular state? At Athens, where the rule is reputed to have been most democratic of all, a fourth class, the weakest and the poorest, that is, by far the largest part of the population) according to the law of Solon had been kept away from honors, from the senate, and from the sortition of office, as Plutarch wrote. Bodin's disagreement with Cicero on his definition of a State, although it indicates the best objective; it confuses state & association >Cicero's definition of the state as a group of men associated for the sake of living well indicates the best objective, indeed, but not the power and the nature of the institution. This definition applies equally well to the assemblies of the Pythagoreans and of men who also come together for the sake of living well, yet they cannot be called states without great confusion of state and association.

Punishments for Traitor Nobles >Yet true it is, that the noble man which is a traitor unto his prince, deserves to be hanged; so to be more grievously punished than the base companion, who offends not so much as he, as not so straightly bound to preserve the life and estate of his prince. For the more a man is obliged and bound in fidelity unto his prince, the more grievously he is be punished above the common person: Viri fortes (saith Cicero speaking of Catilin the rebel) acerbioribus supplicijs ciuem pernitiosum quàm acer bissimum hostem coer∣cendum putant, Worthy men (says he) judge the dangerous citizen to be with greater punishment chastised, than the cruelest enemy that is. And therefore Livy says, the fugitive traitors during the Carthaginian war, to have been more severely punished, than the fugitive slaves: and the Roman traitors more sharply than the Latines, who were then still beheaded, but the Roman traitors hanged. >Howbeit that in all other offences the Romans were more easily punished than others. For Scipio Africanus (says Florius) caused the Roman soldier not keeping his rank, to bee beaten with a vine, but other soldiers with a trunchion or cudgell of other sadder wood: the vine (as saith Plinie) being the dishonour of the punishment. Jean Bodin on Aristotle concerning Arithmetical, Geometrical, & Harmonical Justice: >Now of these two factions arise a third, which was of opinion, That in every Commonwealth Arithmetical Justice was to be kept in just equality, when question was of the goods of any one in particular, or for the recompensing of offences and forfeitures: but if question were of common rewards to be bestowed out of the common treasure, or for the division of countries conquered, or for the inflicting of common punishments, that then Distributive, or Geometrical Justice, was to be observed and kept, having regard unto the good or evil deserts, and the quality or calling of every man: insomuch that these men used two proportions, and yet for all that diversely, sometime the one and some∣time the other: as Aristotle said it ought to be done, but yet not naming either Plato or Xenophon, who yet had both first touched this string. <Note: Aristotle his opinion concerning the execution of Geometrical and Arithmetical Justice, rejected >Neither are we to stay upon the opinion of Aristotle, who would Geometrical justice to take place in bestowing of rewards, and dividing of spoils: but Arithmetical justice equally to bee executed in the inflicting of punishments, which is not only to overthrow the principles of Philosophy, which will that things contrary, as reward and punishment, should be ordered by the same rules, but also the resolution of all the greatest Lawyers and Law-makers that ever were: with whom also the Canonists, the Orators, the Historiographers, and Poets in opinion agree, and have always more easily punished the noble than the baser sort: >But as for Harmonical Justice, not one of the ancient writers either Greeks or Latines, neither yet any other, ever made mention, whether it were for the distribution of justice, or for the government of the Commonwealth: which for all that is of the rest the most divine, and most excellent and best fitting a Royal estate; governed in part Aristocratically, and in part Popularly. But forasmuch as this point we hear speak of, evil understood, draws after it a number of errours, whether it be in making of laws, or in the interpretation of them, or in all sorts of judgements; and to the end also that every man may understand, that this third opinion of Aristotle can no more be main∣ained than the other. >Now had Aristotle himself never so little a while been a judge, or looked into the laws of his country, he would never have written, That the equal Arithmeticall Justice were to be observed and kept in the inflicting of punishments: but that in all things, and especially in matters of punishments, the Geometricall proportion of Justice were much better and more tolerable; as nearer unto the Harmonicall Justice which we seek after, being partaker of both. Neither by this Harmonicall proportion is more favour shewed unto the noble than unto the base, howbeit that unto many it seem contrary. For proof whereof, let it be, that a rich man and a poor being guilty of the self same crime, the rich man is in shew more grievously fined than the poor: howbeit that in truth the one is not more heavily fined than the other, but both of them indifferently according to their wealth and ability. >Wherein Aristotle is again deceived, in that he deems a stolen thing ought by Arithmetical proportion to bee made even with particular interest of him from whom it was taken or stolen. Whereas the laws of Solon, the laws of the Twelve Tables, and the emperors by their laws, condemn him which has stolen any thing, to restore the double or the treble, yea and sometime four fold the worth of the thing stolen, beside the perpetual infamy thereof en∣suing. Yea the law of God wills, That for an oxe stolen, restitution should bee made -- unto him from whom he was so stolen: both for that a more profitable beast is not by God given unto man, as also for the necessity there is to leave such beasts oft times in the field: where they roaming up and down, have for their more assurance the greater penalty set upon them being stolen: and hereunto some other people have joined corporal punishment, yea even unto the pain of death. >Now all the laws both ancient and new, with the common course and experience of judgements, teach us that Harmonical proportion of justice ought as well to take place when question is but of private men's right and interest, and so in pure civil causes, as well as when question is of penalties and fines: as also that Arithmetical equality and proportion is therein most of all uniust. And therefore Justinian the emperor publishing the law concerning usury, ordained, That the nobility should not take above five in the hundred, the merchants eight in the hundred, corporations and colleges ten, and the rest six in the hundred: and particularly that none should exact of the husbandman above five in the hundred. Which law let it seem in Aristotle his judgment uniust, yet does it carry a good show of that Harmonical Justice which we seek after, tempered of Arithmetical and Geometrical proportion: -- >So also these two proportions of Arithmetical and Geometrical government, the one governing by law only, and the other by discretion without any law at all, do ruin at and destroy estates and Commonwealths: but being by Harmonical proportion compounded and combined together, serve well to preserve and maintain the same.

http://constitution.org/2-Authors/bodin/bodin_6.htm As a Platonist Bodin thought that moral as well as physical relationships could be expressed mathematically. So, commutative justice, or the principle of equality, is like an arithmetical progression — 3, 9, 15, 21 — arising from the addition of a constant number. Distributive justice, or the principle of similarity, is like a geometrical progression — 3, 9, 27, 81 — made by multiplication in a constant ratio. The only way of combining these diverse kinds of proportion is in a harmonic progression — 3, 4, 6, 8, 12 — in which alternate terms are in a constant ratio, but consecutive terms linked by a number alternately added and multiplied. This he thought provided a scheme of subtle and complex relationships more expressive of right order in the commonwealth than either of the other two, which only allow of one uniform relationship. For clarity, the mathematical formulae have been translated into their political equivalents throughout the chapter. -- THE nearer a kingdom approaches to realizing harmonic justice, the nearer it is to perfection. By justice I mean the proper distribution of rewards and punishments, and of those advantages due to each individual as a matter of right. This distribution must be based partly on the principle of equality and partly on that of similarity, which properly conjoined issue in harmonic justice[4] ... But neither the Greeks, the Romans, nor anyone since has considered it either in relation to the administration of the law, or the government of the commonwealth. Yet it is the most perfect form of justice, and proper to a royal monarchy, governed in part through popular, in part through aristocratic institutions. ... Geometric or distributive proportion is based on the principle of similarity, arithmetic or commutative proportion on the principle of equality. Harmonic is a fusion of the two which nevertheless does not resemble either ... Government by distributive proportion unites like to like. This is illustrated by the marriage laws of the Twelve Tables, under which nobles were required to marry nobles, commoners, commoners. This rule is still strictly followed in Ragusa. By this principle princes should only marry princesses, wealthy men rich wives, poor men poor ones, and slaves slaves. If however marriages were arranged by casting lots, a slave might marry a king. Poor and humble people would not ask anything better, for they want to make things more equal. But these two principles of government both involve many disadvantages, for by the one the poor are oppressed, and by the other the nobles slighted. The harmonic principle however unites the two. Still keeping to the example of the marriage laws, one would not insist that noblemen of four quarterings should only marry those of a like descent, as is still the case in some places in Germany... It is better if the rich burgess marries a poor noblewoman, or a poor gentleman a rich commoner, the man with some grace of mind a wife with some grace of body. This is to be preferred to marriages between people quite alike in all respects. We see the same thing in business, for the most successful partnerships are those between a rich sleeping partner and a poor man of ability to run the business. There is both equality and similarity between them. Equality in that each has some contribution to make, similarity in that each lacks some indispensable attribute. ... An egalitarian order, based on the principle of commutative justice, is natural to popular states. It is agreed that estates, honours, offices, benefices, booty, and confiscated lands ought to be equally divided, and that when laws are to be made, officers appointed, or a matter of life and death determined, everyone is called upon to take part, the most foolish and irresponsible having exactly the same importance and influence as the wisest... In popular states everything is decided by lot, and regulated by fixed and invariable laws, not susceptible of any equitable interpretation, nor admitting any privilege or exception of persons, so that nobles are liable to the same punishments as commoners, fines imposed on the rich are the same as those imposed on the poor, and the same rewards are bestowed upon the able and the feeble, upon the commander of an army and the private soldier. On the other hand aristocracies are regulated by the principle of distributive justice ... and it is agreed that the execution of the law ought to be adapted to the circumstances of each case. It is however impossible that a so-called law can really be regarded as such if it is indefinitely flexible. A law is not properly speaking a law if it is as malleable as wax, and the man who should obey it can mould it as he wills. In order therefore to avoid on the one hand the unmitigated rigidity of the commutative principle, and the variability and uncertainty of the distributive on the other, one needs to find a third principle which is not so rigid that it cannot be modified if circumstances require it. One must, in fact, aim at the principle of harmonic justice, which combines harmoniously law, equity, the execution of the law, and the function of the magistrate, both in the administration of justice, and in the governance of the state. In the series 4, 6, 8,12, there is the same ratio between 4 and 6 as there is between 8 and 12, and also between 4 and 8 as there is between 6 and 12. Similarly there is the same relation between law and equity as there is between the execution of the law and the function of the magistrate, and also between law and its execution as there is between equity and the function of the magistrate....

The first occasion of men making laws was when primitive monarchies were converted to popular states, as happened in Athens in the time of Dracon and Solon, and in Sparta when Lycurgus broke the power of the two kings. The common people demanded equality with the rich and the noble, and this could only be achieved through equalizing laws. The rich on the other hand insisted on their privileges. Because the burden of maintaining the commonwealth fell on them, they considered that the rich should be advanced in proportion to the size of their estates and the importance of their charges. Therefore the Tribune Terentius Arsa proposed a law to the people requiring the magistrates for the future to be guided in their actions by certain fixed rules. The nobles opposed the measure, which to them spelt ruin, and would have preferred to restore the monarchy. The matter was disputed for six years, but in the end the commons defeated the nobles. The Twelve Tables were therefore published, including a provision that no privilege was to be granted anyone, on pain of death, at least without the consent of the popular assembly. Under these laws the magistrates were required to govern by strict rules which did not permit of any exercise of discretion, or appeal to equity.... It is important to notice however that the word equity can be used diversely. Equity in a ruler is the power to declare or to correct the law. In a magistrate it is the power of applying it by relaxing its rigour or stiffening its leniency when there is need, and by supplying its defects where its provisions are inadequate to a given case ... In this respect the most humble judges have the same kind of discretion as the most exalted, but neither of them can do what a sovereign court can, that is to say reverse a judgement on appeal, or exempt an accused person entirely from paying the penalty under the law. They can only act within their terms of reference ... But to speak truly, law without equity is like a body without a soul, seeing that the law can only lay down general rules, while equity is dependent on the circumstances of particular cases, which are infinitely variable. The law must be accommodated to these circumstances, whether it is a matter of the administration of justice or affairs of state, if awkward or absurd consequences are to be avoided. The magistrates however must not bend the law so much as to break it, even if it is a severe law, when its intention is unambiguous ... As an ancient doctor once said, it does not pertain to the magistrates to judge of the law, but to judge according to the law. If he does otherwise, he is by common agreement unworthy of his office ... The magistrate is under the law, and equity should be in his soul, whereby it is his duty to supply its defects, and elucidate its principles, for the right interpretation of law is the very essence of law. ... In nearly all the customs and ordinances of this realm, fines are of fixed amounts ... and embody a clause 'it is forbidden to our judges to modify this penalty'. If the convicted person has not the wherewithal to discharge the fine imposed for his default or fraud, by a general rule common to all peoples, he must then suffer corporal punishment. To this it may be objected that it is unjust to condemn a poor man to a fine of say sixty livres on some frivolous charge, and require no greater sum from a rich man. By the principle of distributive justice, if a poor man whose total assets only amounted to one hundred livres was sentenced to a fine of sixty livres, the rich man who has one hundred thousand livres ought to pay sixty thousand livres, since sixty bears the same proportion to a hundred, as sixty thousand to a hundred thousand. The consequence is that in the one case the principle of distributive justice deprives the rich of their privileges, and in the other the principle of commutative justice can be used by the rich as a means of ruining the poor under the cloak of justice. For this reason our ordinances permit a judge to levy an extraordinary fine where the circumstances warrant it, in addition to the ordinary amount fixed by law. This comes very near the principle of harmonic justice. What further is required is that the ordinances should allow judges, or at least supreme courts also to abate a fine, having regard to the resources of the poor and ignorant, as in fact is always done by the high court of Rouen ... But he who would be guided by the principle of strict distributive justice, and make the punishment exactly fit both the crime and the criminal must give up the attempt to formulate laws for this purpose, for the variety of persons, acts, times, and places is infinite, and cannot be comprehended within the scope of any general rule. On the other hand a strict equality of penalties on the principle of commutative justice is unjust. ... However although a popular state is characterized by equal laws on the principle of commutative justice, whereas an aristocracy preserves the principle of distributive justice, each must borrow something from the other if they are to be preserved, and so approximate to harmonic justice. Otherwise, were an aristocracy to exclude the common people from the estates, and from all honours and offices, denying them any share in the spoils of war or conquered territories, the common people, however much they might be strangers to arms, would revolt and bring a revolution in the government as soon as an opportunity offered. This may be seen in the Signory of Venice, which is an aristocracy if ever there was one, and governs itself in accordance with aristocratic principles, reserving all high honours and dignities, benefices, and magistracies to Venetian gentlemen, and only giving subordinate offices to which no power is attached to commoners, following therein the principle of distributive justice, much to the great, little to the humble. Nevertheless, in order to keep the common people content, they open to them the office of Chancellor which is one of the highest and most honourable, besides being a perpetual office. To this they add the Secretaryships of State, also very important and honourable offices. Furthermore the least offence committed by a Venetian gentleman against any inhabitant of the city is strictly punished, and indeed, there is a general ease and liberty for all which is more suggestive of a popular than an aristocratic state. Magistrates are appointed by a mixed system of election and lot, the one characteristic of aristocracies, the other of popular states. In short, the two types of institutions are so well combined that it is clear that though an aristocracy, it is the fact that it is regulated according to the principles of harmonic justice that has made this republic so admirable and so nourishing. ...

A king can however, in the first place, govern his kingdom as if it were a popular state, on egalitarian principles, throwing open all public office whatsoever to all his subjects indifferently, without distinguishing merit, or suitability, by the means of filling offices, either by casting lots, or by a strict system of rotation. There are however few or none such monarchies. Or the king can govern his kingdom aristocratically, distributing honours and honourable charges, rewards and penalties in proportion to the nobility of some, and the wealth of others, but excluding poor commoners, without regard to their merits, but singling out only those with birth or wealth. Though both these systems are bad, the latter is much the more tolerable since it approaches nearest to an harmonious system. For the king, in order to protect his authority from the envy of the common people, inclines to the nobility, whose quality more nearly approaches his own than that of the commoners, with whom he is not on terms of social intercourse, for he cannot very well so far abate his dignity as to be on terms of familiarity with them. He would have to do this if he were to open honours and honourable charges to them. Such a government however is as damaging to the noblesse and the king as it is to the commons, for they both necessarily live in fear of the discontented masses, who must always heavily outnumber the rich and the nobly born. If they take to arms they are the stronger party, and can rise against the king, expel the nobility, and defy his authority, as happened with the Swiss, and many commonwealths in the ancient world. The explanation is obvious. The common people were not bound by any tie either to the king or to the nobility. ... A wise king ought therefore to govern his kingdom harmoniously, subtly combining nobles and commons, rich and poor with such skill as always to preserve some advantage for the noble over the commoner. For it is right that the gentleman who is as practised in arms and in law as a commoner should be preferred to him in matters of justice and of war, or that the rich man, equal in all other respects to the poor one should be preferred in those offices which carry with them greater honour than profit. Both will then be content, for the rich man only looks for honour, but the poor man for profit... There is no way of combining great and small, nobleman and commoner, rich and poor, save by giving estates, dignities, and benefices to those who deserve them. But deserts are various. If responsible and honourable charges were only given to the virtuous the commonwealth would always be in a state of confusion, seeing that such men are always few in number, and easily overcome by the rest. But in associating upright men now with nobles, now with rich citizens, even though these last may be quite devoid of virtue, they are nattered to be associated with those who possess it, while they in their turn are gratified to find themselves advanced to some honourable employment. Thus on the one hand the nobility are satisfied that birth is respected in the distribution of honours, on the other the commons are deeply gratified and feel themselves generally honoured. In fact they are so honoured when the son of a poor physician can become the Chancellor of a great kingdom, or the son of a poor soldier High Constable, as happened in the case of Michel de l'Hôpital and Bertrand du Guesclin among many others, whose virtues alone led to their promotion to the very highest offices. But all classes see with impatience the most unworthy promoted to the most responsible positions, though it is occasionally necessary to give some offices to incapable and unworthy persons, provided it is done so sparingly that their ignorance or vice cannot do any great harm in the position they hold. It is not sufficient to entrust finance to the most trustworthy, war to the most valiant, justice to the most upright, censure to the most incorruptible, work to the strongest, government to the wisest, religion to the most devout, as the principle of distributive justice requires, though this in fact cannot be achieved because of the scarcity of good men. To ensure a general harmony one must combine those who can supply one another's shortcomings. Otherwise there will be no harmony than if one sounded separately notes sweet in themselves, but only capable of producing a consonance when struck together. In doing this the prince reconciles his subjects to one another, and all alike to himself. ...

Interesting quotations a friend provided me from a Christian standpoint on Monarchy.

Which also has a voice in Pagan antiquity btw (if you care about that).

This is the end of my 2nd Containment thread. If any visitor to /monarchy/ reads - 1st Grace Containment Thread - 2nd Grace Containment Thread - The Monarchy Generals - All the infographics in the Grace chan thread - Royal Colony threads You will be well versed in the politics here & my years of study. I have reached my pinnacle in studying absolute monarchy, but here I will probably slow my studies & begin to retire (at least in my study; I won't ever stop shilling absolute monarchy or posting Grace).

(Last post for this thread): Hobbes / Cities & Kingdoms which are but greater Families >And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families. Plato - Royal Weaver <Note: Though that saying is attributed to PLato, I think in the Statesmen, Plato gives an account on the harmony of government. He says that the art of the statesmen is like the weaver, in its proportionate binding the woof and the warp together. >STRANGER: It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty in creating them, if only both classes originally held the same opinion about the honourable and the good;--indeed, in this single work, the whole process of royal weaving is comprised--never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours and reputation, and by giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one smooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of State. ... >STRANGER: This then we declare to be the completion of the web of political action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn the two minds into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship, and having perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political life admits, and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over them, and, in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a city, in no particular fails to secure their happiness.